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Abstract
This paper examines the determinant of trading partner selection for a licenser. The licenser negotiates with either
a downstream incumbent which has its own production facility (the outside option) or a downstream entrant, and
determines a two-part tariff for licensing. If the licenser trades with the entrant (the incumbent), the downstream
market becomes a duopoly (monopoly). We find that the licenser’s bargaining power over the incumbent does not
influence the licenser’s decision on its trading partner although that over the entrant, its marginal costs of licensing to
the entrant and the incumbent, and the incumbent’s outside value matter for its decision.
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1 Introduction
Many luxury brand firms have licensing agreements globally to develop their business, and gain licensing revenues.
For instance, Burberry, a British luxury-brand firm, licenses its trademark to manufacturers (downstream firms) in
many countries, and obtains licensing revenues 109.4m$ in 2013. Approximately 60% of those was obtained by
its licensed business in Japan.1 Prada, an Italian luxury-brand firm, also develops its licensed business, and gains
licensing revenues 43.4me in 2015.2 Prada annual reports state that Prada chooses carefully the licensing partner
for its licensed business in order to achieve success in the global luxury-goods market. What factors determine the
licensing partner for luxury brand firms? To address such an issue, this paper investigates the determinant of the
licensing partner selection.
We provide a simple model which explains the determinant to select an upstream licenser’s downstream partner
(licensing partner). The setting is as follows. There are an incumbent and an entrant in a downstream market. They
compete in quantity. The upstream licenser first decides with whom to negotiate. Second, it negotiates with the chosen
downstream firm, and determines a two-part tariff for licensing. In the negotiation between the upstream licenser and
the chosen downstream firm, we adopt a Nash bargaining approach.3 We assume that only the incumbent has its own
production facility, and thereby it is able to produce the final product even without a licensing agreement with the
upstream licenser. In other words, only the incumbent has the outside option.4 Therefore, the downstream market
structure depends on with whom the upstream licenser negotiates. If the upstream licenser first negotiates with the
entrant and the first negotiation reaches an agreement, the downstream market is a duopoly because the incumbent
uses its own production facility (the outside option). However, if the first negotiation reaches a disagreement, it second
negotiates with the incumbent. If the second negotiation reaches an agreement, the market is a bilateral monopoly
because the entrant does not have a production facility (an outside option). If the second negotiation also reaches a
disagreement, the upstream licenser is not active and the incumbent monopolizes the market. On the other hand, if the
upstream licenser first negotiates with the incumbent and the first negotiation reaches an agreement, the market is a
bilateral monopoly. However, if the first negotiation reaches a disagreement, it second negotiates with the entrant. If
the second negotiation reaches an agreement, the downstream market is a duopoly because the incumbent uses its own
production facility (the outside option). If the second negotiation also reaches a disagreement, the upstream licenser
is not active and the incumbent monopolizes the market.
We find that the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over the incumbent which is denoted by  does not matter
for the upstream licenser’s decision on its trading partner although that over the entrant which is denoted by  matters
for its decision. When the upstream licenser trades with the entrant (the incumbent), in addition to the net gain
obtained from trading with the incumbent (the entrant) after the negotiation breakdown which is weighted by  (),
the upstream licenser obtains the net gain from trading with the entrant (the incumbent) which is weighted by  ()
(the gross profit obtained from trading with the entrant (the incumbent) minus the net gain obtained from trading with
1See Burberry Group plc annual report 2013.
2See Prada annual report 2015.
3Naylor (2002) adopts a Nash bargaining game in the bilateral oligopoly model.
4This assumption reflects the behavior of a Japanese apparel manufacturer, Sanyo Shokai. Sanyo Shokai has manufactured the final product after
Burberry terminated the licensing agreement with Sanyo Shokai in 2015.
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the incumbent (the entrant) after the negotiation breakdown which is weighted by  ()). Because the entrant does not
have a production facility (an outside option), the entrant’s outside value is not included in the net gain obtained from
trading with the entrant. Thereby, the gross profit obtained from trading with the entrant when the upstream licenser
trades with the entrant which is weighted by  is equal to the net gain obtained from trading with the entrant after the
negotiation with the incumbent breaks down which is weighted by . Thus, these two cancel each other out when the
upstream licenser compares the profits in the two trade cases. We then find that the remaining ones are weighted by
. This means that the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over the incumbent does not influence the comparison of
the upstream licenser’s profits in the two trade cases although it influences the absolute amount of that.
This paper is related to the literatures on trading partner selection. Several theoretical papers examine the number
of downstream partner that maximizes an upstream firm’s revenue. Chemla (2003) shows that an upstream firm
has incentives to contract with many downstream partners in order to lower downstream firms’ bargaining power by
promoting the downstream competition. Matsushima and Shinohara (2014) examines the determinant of the number
of buyers for an input supplier. Rey and Salant (2012) and Kishimoto and Watanabe (2017) investigate the determinant
of the number of licensees for property owners. Our paper examines the determinant of a downstream partner selection
for an upstream licenser which trades exclusively with a downstream firm.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 does its results. We then consider
the situation where no firm has a production facility (an outside option) as a benchmark. Section 4 discusses, and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a market with an upstream licenser and two downstream firms, an incumbent (I) and an entrant (E).
The two downstream firms produce the final product, and compete in quantity. The upstream licenser first chooses
firm i (i = I; E) as its negotiation partner, and second, it negotiates with the chosen firm i and determines a two-part
tariff for licensing, (wi; Ti), where wi denotes a per-unit fee and Ti does a fixed fee. In the negotiation between the
upstream licenser and the chosen firm i, we adopt a Nash bargaining approach.
We assume that only firm I has its own production facility, and thereby it can produce the final product even without
a licensing agreement with the upstream licenser. In other words, only firm I has the outside option. Therefore, the
structure of the downstream market depends on with whom the upstream licenser trades. If the upstream licenser
trades with firm E, the downstream market is a duopoly because firm I uses its own production facility. If the
upstream licenser trades with firm I , the market is a bilateral monopoly because firm E does not have a production
facility.
Let qi denote the quantity supplied by firm i. The inverse demand function is p(qE ; qI) (p(qI)) if the downstream
market is a duopoly (monopoly). The upstream licenser has a marginal cost of licensing to firm i, ci (i = I; E). If
the incumbent (the entrant) is a licensee, the marginal cost of the upstream licenser is cI (cE). We assume that the
marginal cost of licensing to firm E, cE , is equal to or smaller than that to firm I , cI (cE  cI ). Firm I incurs a
marginal cost of production, hI , if it uses its own production facility. The marginal cost of production, hI , is larger
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than the marginal cost of licensing to firm I , cI (cE  cI < hI ).
We consider a three-period game. In period 1, the upstream licenser determines the first negotiation partner. If it
chooses firm E (firm I) as the first negotiation partner, it negotiates with firm E (firm I) at stage 1 in period 2. If the
first negotiation reaches an agreement, firms E and I are active (only firm I is active) in the downstream market, and
the game goes to period 3. Otherwise, the upstream licenser negotiates with firm I (firm E) at stage 2 in period 2. If
the second negotiation reaches an agreement, only firm I is active (firms E and I are active) in the downstream market
and the game goes to period 3. Otherwise, the upstream licenser is inactive and only firm I is active in the market. In
period 2, a negotiating pair determines a two-part tariff for licensing. In period 3, the downstream firms set quantity if
possible.
3 Analysis
We consider two sub-games that follow the decision in period 1: the entrant is the first negotiation partner (case 1); the
incumbent is the first negotiation partner (case 2). Assuming a general demand function, we solve the two sub-games
through backward induction.?
3.1 Benchmark: no firm has an outside option
As a benchmark, we first consider a situation in which no firm has a production facility (an outside option). In this
situation, the downstream market is a monopoly regardless of the outcome of bargaining among the upstream licenser
and firm i (i = I; E).
3.1.1 Quantity setting and per-unit fee
When the upstream licenser negotiates with firm i at stage 2 (stage 1) in period 2, given the two-part tariff contract,
the profit of firm i in period 3 is
mi (qi; wi) = (p(qi)  wi)qi   Ti;
where the superscriptm indicates monopoly. The first-order condition for profit maximization is
@mi (qi; wi)
@qi
=
dp(qi)
dqi
qi + p(qi)  wi = 0: (1)
From Eq.(1), the output is qi(wi). The profit of firm i is
mi (qi(wi); wi) = 
m
i (wi)  Ti;
where mi (wi)  (p(qi(wi))  wi)qi(wi) indicates the gross profit for firm i. The profit of the upstream licenser is
mi (qi(wi); wi) = (wi   ci)qi(wi) + Ti;
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where the subscript i (i = I; E) indicates the profit of the upstream licenser obtained when it trades with firm i. The
joint profit of the upstream licenser and firm i is given by
mi (qi(wi); wi) + 
m
i (qi(wi); wi) = (p(qi(wi))  ci)qi(wi):
The first-order condition for the joint profit maximization:
 ci + d p(qi(wi))
d qi(wi)
qi(wi) + p(qi(wi))
	d qi(wi)
d wi
= 0;
From the envelope theorem, the optimal per-unit fee is wi = ci. That is, the upstream licenser optimally sets the
per-unit fee at the marginal cost of licensing to firm i, ci. Thus, the equilibrium output of firm i is qi(ci), and the
equilibrium profit of firm i and the upstream licenser, mi (qi(ci); ci) and 
m
i (qi(ci); ci), respectively, are
mi (qi(ci); ci) = 
m
i (ci)  Ti;
mi (qi(ci); ci) = Ti:
3.1.2 Fixed fee in case 1 where the entrant is the first negotiation partner
At stage 2 in period 2, the upstream licenser negotiates with firm I . TI is determined such that TI : mI (cI) TI =  :
(1   ) is satisfied, where the parameter  2 (0; 1) represents the bargaining power of the upstream licenser relative
to that of firm I . Therefore, we obtain
TI = 
m
I (cI):
This represents the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades with firm E.
At stage 1 in period 2, anticipating the negotiation at stage 2 in period 2, the upstream licenser negotiates with firm
E. TE is determined such that TE   TI : mE (cE)   TE =  : (1   ) is satisfied, where the parameter  2 (0; 1)
represents the bargaining power of the upstream licenser relative to that of firmE. Therefore, the profit of the upstream
licenser is given by
TnE = (
m
E (cE)  mI (cI)) + mI (cI); (2)
where the superscript n indicates that no firm has an outside option. In the first term, mE (cE)   mI (cI) represents
the net gain obtained from trading with firm E.
From Eq.(2), the upstream licenser has incentives to trade with the first negotiation partner, firmE, if the following
condition holds.
mE (cE) > 
m
I (cI): (3)
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3.1.3 Fixed fee in case 2 where the incumbent is the first negotiation partner
At stage 2 in period 2, the upstream licenser negotiates with firm E. TE is determined such that TE : mE (cE) TE =
 : (1  ) is satisfied. Therefore, we obtain
TE = 
m
E (cE):
This represents the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades firm I .
At stage 1 in period 2, anticipating the negotiation at stage 2 in period 2, the upstream licenser negotiates with firm
I . TI is determined such that TI   TE : mI (cI)  TI =  : (1  ) is satisfied. The profit of the upstream licenser is
given by
TnI = (
m
I (cI)  mE (cE)) + mE (cE): (4)
In the first term, mI (cI)  mE (cE) represents the net gain obtained from trading with firm I .
From Eq.(4), the upstream licenser has incentives to trade with the first negotiation partner, firm I , if the following
condition holds.
mI (cI) > 
m
E (cE): (5)
3.1.4 Selection of the trading partner
In period 1, the upstream licenser determines its trading partner. Assuming that Eq.(3) and Eq.(5) hold, we examine
the determinant of its trading partner selection when no firm has a production facility (an outside option).
Because firm E’s outside value is zero, its outside value is not included in the net gain obtained from trading
with firm E, mE (cE)   mI (cI). Thereby, the gross profit obtained from trading with firm E when the upstream
licenser trades with firm E which is weighted by the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over firm E, mE (cE)
in Eq.(2), is equal to the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades firm I , mE (cE) in Eq.(4). Because firm
I’s outside value is also zero, its outside value is not included in the net gain obtained from trading with firm I ,
mI (cI)   mE (cE). Thereby, the gross profit obtained from trading with firm I when the upstream licenser trades
with firm I which is weighted by the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over firm I , mI (cI) in Eq.(4), is equal
to the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades firm E, mI (cI) in Eq.(2). Therefore, comparing Eq.(2) and
Eq.(4), these two cancel each other out. We then find that the remaining ones are weighted by the upstream licenser’s
bargaining powers over the downstream firms,  and . This is understood by the following equation. This means that
the upstream licenser’s bargaining powers over the downstream firms do not affect the comparison of the upstream
licenser’s profits in the two cases although they affect the absolute amount of that.
TnE   TnI = (mE (cE)  mI (cI)); (6)
Considering cE  cI , we find that the upstream licenser prefers to trade with firm E rather than firm I if and only if
mE (cE) > 
m
I (cI). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the situation where no firm has a production facility, the parameters of the upstream licenser’s
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bargaining power over the downstream firms have no effect on the upstream licenser’s decision on its trading partner.
The determinant of the upstream licenser’s trading partner selection is just the marginal costs of the upstream licenser,
cE and cI .
3.2 Only the incumbent has its own outside option
We consider the situation in which only the incumbent has its own production facility (the outside option). In this situ-
ation, the downstream market structure depends on with whom the upstream licenser negotiates unlike the benchmark.
3.2.1 Quantity competition and per-unit fee
When the upstream licenser negotiates with firm I at stage 2 (stage 1) in period 2, because the mathematical procedures
is the same as in the benchmark, we briefly show the equilibrium values. Because the optimal per-unit fee is wI = cI ,
the equilibrium output of firm I is qI(cI). The equilibrium profit of firm I and the upstream licenser, mI (qI(cI); cI)
and mI (qI(cI); cI), respectively, are
mI (qI(cI); cI) = 
m
I (cI)  TI ;
mI (qI(cI); cI) = TI :
When the upstream licenser negotiates with firm E at stage 1 (stage 2) in period 2, the downstream market is a
duopoly because firm I uses the outside option if the negotiation at this stage reaches an agreement. Given the two-part
tariff contract, the profit of firms E and I in period 3, respectively, are
dE(qE ; qI ; wE) = (p(qE ; qI)  wE)qE   TE ;
dI (qE ; qI ; hI) = (p(qE ; qI)  hI)qI ;
where the superscript d indicates duopoly. The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
@dE(qE ; qI ; wE)
@qE
=
@p(qE ; qI)
@qE
qE + p(qE ; qI)  wE = 0; (7)
@dI (qE ; qI ; hI)
@qI
=
@p(qE ; qI)
@qI
qI + p(qE ; qI)  hI = 0: (8)
From Eq.(7) and (8), the output of firm E is qE(wE ; hI). We now assume that the two-part tariff contract does not
observable for firm I . Thereby, the output of firm I is qI( wE ; hI), where wE is firm I’s expectation on the per-unit
fee that the upstream licenser offers firm E. Therefore, the profit of firm E is
dE(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI); wE ; wE ; hI) = 
d
E(wE ; wE ; hI)  TE ;
where dE(wE ; wE ; hI)  (p(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI))   wE)qE(wE ; hI) denotes the gross profit for firm E. The
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profit of firm I is
dI (qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI); wE ; wE ; hI) = 
d
I (wE ; wE ; hI);
where dI (wE ; wE ; hI)  (p(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI))  hI)qI( wE ; hI). The profit of the upstream licenser is
dE(qE(wE ; hI); wE ; hI) = (wE   cE)qE(wE ; hI) + TE :
The joint profit for the upstream licenser and firm E is given by
dE(qE(wE ; hI); wE ; hI)+
d
E(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI); wE ; wE ; hI) = (p(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI)) cE)qE(wE ; hI):
The first-order condition for the joint profit maximization is
 cE + @p(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI))
@qE(wE ; hI)
qE(wE ; hI) + p(qE(wE ; hI); qI( wE ; hI))
	@qE(wE ; hI)
@wE
= 0:
From the envelope theorem, the optimal per-unit fee is wE = cE . That is, the upstream licenser optimally sets the
per-unit at the marginal cost of licensing to firm E, cE . Thus, the equilibrium output of firm E is qE(cE ; hI). Because
firm I expects the per-unit fee, cE , the equilibrium output of firm I is qI(cE ; hI). The equilibrium profits of firms E
and I , dE(qE(cE ; hI); qI(cE ; hI); cE ; hI) and 
d
I (qE(cE ; hI); qI(cE ; hI); cE ; hI), respectively, are
dE(qE(cE ; hI); qI(cE ; hI); cE ; hI) = 
d
E(cE ; hI)  TE :
dI (qE(cE ; hI); qI(cE ; hI); cE ; hI) = 
d
I (cE ; hI)
The equilibrium profit of the upstream licenser, dE(qE(cE ; hI); cE ; hI), is
dE(qE(cE ; hI); cE ; hI) = TE :
3.2.2 Fixed fee in case 1 where the entrant is the first negotiation partner
At stage 2 in period 2, TI is determined such that TI : mI (cI)   TI   mI (hI) =  : (1   ) is satisfied, where
mI (hI)  (p(qI(hI))  hI)qI(hI) denotes firm I’s outside value. The profit of the upstream licenser is
TI = (
m
I (cI)  mI (hI)); (9)
This represents the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades with firm E. This includes firm I’s outside value,
mI (hI), because firm I has its own production facility (the outside option). Therefore, firm I’s outside value has
negative effect on the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades with firm E.
At stage 1 in period 2, anticipating the negotiation at stage 2 in period 2, TE is determined such that TE   TI :
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dE(cE ; hI)  TE =  : (1  ) is satisfied. The profit of the upstream licenser is
T yE = (
d
E(cE ; hI)  (mI (cI)  mI (hI))) + (mI (cI)  mI (hI)); (10)
where the superscript y indicates that only firm I has its own production facility (the outside option). In the first
term, dE(cE ; hI)   (mI (cI)   mI (hI)) represents the net gain obtained from trading with firm E. Unlike the
negotiation with firm I at stage 2 in period 2, this does not include firm E’s outside value because firm E does not
have a production facility (an outside option) and thereby firm E’s outside value is zero. Therefore, firm E’s outside
value has no effect on the net gain obtained from trading with firm E.
lemma 1 In case 1 where the entrant is the first negotiation partner, because the entrant does not have a production
facility (an outside option), the entrant’s outside value is not included in the net gain obtained from trading with the
entrant. On the other hand, because the incumbent has its production facility (the outside option), the incumbent’s
outside value is included in the upstream licenser’s outside value when the upstream licenser trades with firm E.
From Eq.(10), the upstream licenser has incentives to trade with the first negotiation partner, firm E, if the follow-
ing condition holds.
dE(cE ; hI) > (
m
I (cI)  mI (hI)): (11)
3.2.3 Fixed fee in case 2 where the incumbent is the first negotiation partner
At stage 2 in period 2, TE is determined such that TE : dE(cE ; hI)  TE =  : (1  ) is satisfied. The profit of the
upstream licenser is
TE = 
d
E(cE ; hI): (12)
This is the upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades with firm I . As with the negotiation with firm E at stage 1
in period 2 in case 1, this does not include firm E’s outside value because firm E does not have a production facility
and thereby firm E’s outside value is zero.
At stage 1 in period 2, anticipating the negotiation at stage 2 in period 2, TI is determined such that TI   TE :
mI (cI)   TI   dI (cE ; hI) =  : (1   ) is satisfied, dI (cE ; hI) denotes firm I’s outside value. The profit of the
upstream licenser is
T yI = (
m
I (cI)  dI (cE ; hI)  dE(cE ; hI)) + dE(cE ; hI): (13)
In the first term, mI (cI) dI (cE ; hI) dE(cE ; hI) represents the net gain obtained from trading with firm I . Unlike
the negotiation with firm E at stage 2 in period 2, this includes firm I’s outside value, dI (cE ; hI), because firm I has
its own production facility (the outside option).
lemma 2 In the case where the incumbent is the first negotiation partner, because the incumbent has its own produc-
tion facility (the outside option), the incumbent’s outside value is included in the net gain obtained from trading with
the incumbent. On the other hand, because the entrant does not have a production facility (an outside option), the
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entrant’s outside value is not included in the upstream licenser’s outside value when the upstream licenser trades with
firm I .
This lemma states that unlike case 1, firm I’s outside value has negative effect on the net gain obtained from trading
with firm I because firm I has its own production facility (the outside option).
From Eq.(13), the upstream licenser has incentives to trade with the first negotiation partner, firm I , if the following
condition holds.
mI (cI)  dI (cE ; hI) > dE(cE ; hI): (14)
3.2.4 Selection of the trading partner
Assuming that Eq.(11) and Eq.(14) hold, we examine the determinant of the upstream licenser’s trading partner
selection when only firm I has its own production facility (the outside option).
We find that the gross profit obtained from trading with firm E when the upstream licenser trades with firm E
which is weighted by the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over firm E, dE(cE ; hI) in Eq.(10), is equal to the
upstream licenser’s outside value when it trades with firm I , dE(cE ; hI) in Eq.(13). This occurs because firm E’s
outside value is not included in the net gain obtained from trading with firm E, as described by lemma 1 and 2.
Therefore, comparing Eq.(10) with Eq.(13), these two cancel each other out. We then find that the remaining ones are
weighted by the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over firm I , . This is understood by Eq.(15). This means that
the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over firm I does not affect the comparison of the upstream licenser’s profits
in the two cases although it affects the absolute amount of that. That is, the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over
firm I is not the determinant of its trading partner selection although its bargaining power over firm E, its marginal
cost of licensing to firm i, and the incumbent’s outside is the determinant of that.
T yE   T yI = f mI (cI)  (1  )mI (hI) + dE(cE ; hI) + dI (cE ; hI)g: (15)
We then find that the upstream licenser prefers to trade with firm E rather than firm I if and only if (mI (cI)  
mI (hI)) + 
m
I (hI) < 
d
E(cE ; hI) + 
d
I (cE ; hI). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the situation where only the incumbent has its own production facility, the parameter of the upstream
licenser’s bargaining power over the incumbent has no effect on the upstream licenser’s decision on its trading partner.
The determinants of its trading partner selection are the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over the entrant, the
upstream licenser’s marginal cost of licensing to the entrant/the incumbent, and the incumbent’s outside value.
From a rearrangement of Eq.(15), we have the following condition for the upstream licenser to trade with the
entrant/the incumbent if the value of dE(cE ; hI) + 
m
I (hI)  mI (cI) is positive in Eq.(15):8>>><>>>:
T yE > T
y
I if
mI (hI)  dI (cE ; hI)
dE(cE ; hI) + 
m
I (hI)  mI (cI)
<  < minf1; 
m
I (cI)  dI (cE ; hI)
dE(cE ; hI)
g, (16)
T yE < T
y
I if 0 <  <
mI (hI)  dI (cE ; hI)
dE(cE ; hI) + 
m
I (hI)  mI (cI)
, (17)
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where we now assume that dI (cE ; hI) + 
d
E(cE ; hI) > 
m
I (cI) in order to secure the condition that T
y
E > T
y
I .
This assumption implies that industrial profits obtained from trading with firm E are greater than those obtained from
trading with firm I .
The conditions in Eq.(16) and Eq.(17) represent that trading with firm E yields the greater profit of the upstream
licenser if the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over firm E, , is relatively large. Otherwise, trading with firm I
yields the greater profit of the upstream licenser. On the other hand, we find that T yE > T
y
I if the value of 
d
E(cE ; hI)+
mI (hI)   mI (cI) in Eq.(15) is negative. This represents that trading with firm I yields the greater profit of the
upstream licenser in any . In sum, it is desirable for the upstream licenser to trades with firm E if and only if the
value of dE(cE ; hI) + 
m
I (hI)   mI (cI) is positive, and  is retalively large. In other words, the upstream licenser
prefers to trade with firm E if and only if there is less negative effect of the upstream licenser’s outside value on the
net gain obtained from trading firm E when it trades with firm E and there is larger bargaining power over the entrant.
4 Discussion
We now assume that the marginal cost of production when the incumbent uses its own production facility (the outside
option), hI , is nearly equal to the per-unit fee for licensing to firm I , cI . That is, we assume that the incumbent has its
own production facility (the outside option) which is so efficient. Considering the condition Eq.(14), we find that the
upstream licenser’s profit obtained from trading with the incumbent, T yI in Eq.(13), may be greater than that obtained
from trading with the entrant, T yE in Eq.(10). Therefore, the upstream licenser prefers to trade with the incumbent.
The intuition is simple: if the upstream licenser trades with the entrant, the upstream licenser incurs a loss due to the
tough downstream competition with the efficient incumbent. In contrast, assuming that the incumbent has its own
production facility (the outside option) which is so inefficient, the upstream licenser prefers to trade with the entrant
due to the soft downstream competition with the inefficient incumbent. We also find that, whether the incumbent’s
production facility (the outside option) is so efficient or not, the parameters of the upstream licenser’s bargaining power
over the downstream firms,  and , have no effect on the upstream licenser’s decision on its trading partner as with
the benchmark.
We now discuss on promoting downstream competition. Caprice (2005) and Sandonis (2012) show that promoting
downstream competition yields greater profit for an upstream firm. Our paper shows that although trading with the
entrant which does not a production facility (an outside value) promotes downstream competition, that may lead to
greater profit for an upstream firm if trading with the entrant yields the incumbent’s outside value and the upstream
licenser’s outside value smaller than those obtained from trading with the incumbent.
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5 Concluding remarks
We investigate the determinant of trading partner selection for an upstream licenser which trades with either the
incumbent or the entrant. Assuming only the incumbent has its own production facility (the outside option), we find
that the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over the incumbent does not affect the upstream licenser’s decision on
its trading partner although that over the entrant influences its decision. The factors which determines the upstream
licenser’s trading partner are the upstream licenser’s bargaining power over the entrant and the upstream licenser’s
marginal cost of licensing to the entrant/the incumbent, and the incumbent’s outside value.
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